Suchergebnisse

Mainstream discourses tend to treat land dispossession as a 'developing' country problem that arises due to weak/corrupt legal systems and inadequate property institutions. This article unsettles such discourses by examining expropriations for economic 'development' in the United States —a country typically deemed to have strong property institutions and a strong rule of law. Drawing on various examples, I propose that expropriation in the us is neither rigorously conditional nor particularly exceptional. While most 'takings' laws are supposed to restrict the State's power, this restriction hinges on the definition of public use, purpose, necessity, or interest. And in many countries, including the us, these concepts are now defined broadly and vaguely so as to include private for-profit projects. Ultimately, the contents, interpretation, and application of the law are subject to social and political struggles; this point is habitually overlooked in the rule of law 'solutions' to land grabbing—. For these reasons, titling/registration programs and policies aimed at strengthening the rule of law, even if successful, are likely to transform rather than 'solve' dispossession in the global South.

ABSTRACT Mainstream discourses tend to treat land dispossession as a 'developing' country problem that arises due to weak/corrupt legal systems and inadequate property institutions. This article unsettles such discourses by examining expropriations for economic 'development' in the United States -a country typically deemed to have strong property institutions and a strong rule of law. Drawing on various examples, I propose that expropriation in the us is neither rigorously conditional nor particularly exceptional. While most 'takings' laws are supposed to restrict the State's power, this restriction hinges on the definition of public use, purpose, necessity, or interest. And in many countries, including the US, these concepts are now defined broadly and vaguely so as to include private for-profit projects. Ultimately, the contents, interpretation, and application of the law are subject to social and political struggles; this point is habitually overlooked in the rule of law 'solutions' to land grabbing-. For these reasons, titling/registration programs and policies aimed at strengthening the rule of law, even if successful, are likely to transform rather than 'solve' dispossession in the global South.

Mainstream discourses tend to treat land dispossession as a 'developing' country problem that arises due to weak/corrupt legal systems and inadequate property institutions. This article unsettles such discourses by examining expropriations for economic 'development' in the United States —a country typically deemed to have strong property institutions and a strong rule of law. Drawing on various examples, I propose that expropriation in the us is neither rigorously conditional nor particularly exceptional. While most 'takings' laws are supposed to restrict the State's power, this restriction hinges on the definition of public use, purpose, necessity, or interest. And in many countries, including the us, these concepts are now defined broadly and vaguely so as to include private for-profit projects. Ultimately, the contents, interpretation, and application of the law are subject to social and political struggles; this point is habitually overlooked in the rule of law 'solutions' to land grabbing. For these reasons, titling/registration programs and policies aimed at strengthening the rule of law, even if successful, are likely to transform rather than 'solve' dispossession in the global South.

Los discursos dominantes tienden a tratar el despojo de tierras como un problema de los países 'en desarrollo', derivado de sistemas legales débiles/corruptos e instituciones de propiedad inadecuadas. Este artículo desestabiliza esos discursos al examinar casos de expropiación en Estados Unidos (ee. uu.) -país al que normalmente se le considera con instituciones de propiedad robustas y un sólido estado de derecho-. Con base en varios ejemplos, argumento que las expropiaciones en ee. uu. no son rigurosamente condicionadas ni particularmente excepcionales. Si bien la mayoría de las leyes de expropiación supuestamente restringen los poderes del Estado, esta restricción depende de la definición del uso, propósito, necesidad o interés público; además, en muchos países, incluido ee. uu., estos términos son definidos de manera amplia y vaga para así incluir proyectos privados con fines de lucro. En últimas, los contenidos, la interpretación y la aplicación de la ley están sujetos a luchas sociales y políticas -punto que suele ser pasado por alto en las 'soluciones' convencionales al despojo-. Por estas razones, los programas de titulación y las políticas dirigidas al fortalecimiento del estado de derecho (aun cuando sean exitosas) puede que transformen, más que resuelvan, el despojo en el Sur global. ; Mainstream discourses tend to treat land dispossession as a 'developing' country problem that arises due to weak/corrupt legal systems and inadequate property institutions. This article unsettles such discourses by examining expropriations for economic 'development' in the United States -a country typically deemed to have strong property institutions and a strong rule of law. Drawing on various examples, I propose that expropriation in the us is neither rigorously conditional nor particularly exceptional. While most 'takings' laws are supposed to restrict the State's power, this restriction hinges on the definition of public use, purpose, necessity, or interest. And in many countries, including the us, these concepts are now defined broadly and vaguely so as to include private for-profit projects. Ultimately, the contents, interpretation, and application of the law are subject to social and political struggles; this point is habitually overlooked in the rule of law 'solutions' to land grabbing-. For these reasons, titling/registration programs and policies aimed at strengthening the rule of law, even if successful, are likely to transform rather than 'solve' dispossession in the global South.

This paper challenges the traditional threefold classification of forced migration, and proposes a new concept: land-grab-induced displacement. The concept sheds light on issues that are shrouded by the conventional typology. Displacement, frequently treated as the 'collateral damage' of war and climate change, or an unfortunate sacrifice necessitated by 'development', may often be better understood as part of the political economy of land. The notion of land-grab-induced displacement encapsulates cases in which people are forcibly uprooted primarily so that others can control the land and its resources. The argument draws on three examples –from Colombia, Ethiopia and Southeast Asia post-tsunami- in order to highlight the limitations of the standard categorisation, and the need to better integrate land questions into our analytical frameworks of forced displacement.

For decades, Colombian governments have imposed a narrative linking illegal crops with statelessness and presenting 'more state' and specifically 'more law enforcement' as the solution to a swathe of problems in drug-producing regions. We draw on coca growers' own accounts of law enforcement to critique this narrative. Their accounts – specifically from Putumayo in Colombia's Amazonian frontier – refer to persecution for many of the things they do in their everyday lives, not just those directly related to the coca economy. Their livelihoods are constantly under threat from state forces as a result of counternarcotics operations but also due to the imposition of (phyto)sanitary and environmental norms. This generates resentment towards the state, undermining its efforts to establish authority in these territories. Thus, building on coca farmers' accounts, we argue that state weakness in drug-producing areas is a problem of quality and not only quantity. Improving quality means transforming the way lawmakers and enforcers relate to rural citizens. If the Colombian state continues to wage war against the peasantry, it will hardly achieve effective governance of the coca frontier.